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Abstract
In this note, we consider an adverse selection problem involving
an insurance market à la Rothschild-Stiglitz. We assume that part
of the loss is uninsurable as in the case with health care or environ-
mental risk. We characterize su¢ cient conditions such that adverse
selection by itself does not distort competitive insurance contracts. A
su¢ ciently large uninsurable loss provides an incentive to high-risk
policyholders not to mimic low-risk policyholders without distorting
the optimal coverage.
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1 Introduction
The existence of an uninsurable nancial risk a¤ects the individuals insur-
ance choice. Some authors have studied the impact of such background risk
on the theory of insurance demand (Doherty and Schlesinger (1983, 1990) ;
Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) ; Hau (1999)).
The purpose of this note is thus to analyse the e¤ects of nancial back-
ground risk in an adverse selection setting à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
(abbreviated here as RS). To our knowledge, Crocker and Snow (2006) are
the only authors to focus on the e¤ect of a background risk on optimal insur-
ance contracts with adverse selection. They assume that the background risk
is independent of the insurable loss. This additional risk a¤ects the extent of
insurance coverage because it increases the risk aversion of vulnerable agents.
Crocker and Snow show that the RS deductible needed to achieve separation
is lower than in the case of the standard RS model. Moreover, to achieve
a separating equilibrium, the proportion of high-risk agents must be higher
than in RS. Otherwise, pooling equilibrium appears. However, uninsurable
losses are usually perfectly correlated with nancial loss rather than being
independent. This is the case when considering environmental risks, human
capital or health: part of the losses is unobservable and/or uninsurable.
We study here the incidence of an uninsurable loss comonotonic with
the insurable risk in a RS setting. In particular we characterize conditions
underwhich private information does not modify the optimal contracts. Due
to the comonotonic uninsurable loss, the high-risk agent balances between
a higher coverage (and a higher premium) and a smaller premium (with a
smaller coverage). If the agent faces a su¢ ciently large uninsurable risk, the
e¤ect of coverage dominates the e¤ect of premium reduction. The present
study has the following structure. The model is presented in section 2 and
the private information equilibrium is characterized in section 3. Section 4
reports the conclusions.
2 The model
There are two possible states of nature : the "no loss" state occurs with
probability pi and the "loss" state with probability 1  pi: Consumers share
the same Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(W ) whereW denotes
the wealth and W0 the corresponding initial wealth. As in RS, there are two
types of agent in the economy (i 2 fH;Lg for high and low risk) di¤ering in
their loss probabilities : pH > pL. We assume that there is a proportion  of
high-risk agents in the total population.
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In the loss state, their wealth is reduced by an amount Zi = D + i.
We assume H > L = 0. Moreover we consider that only D is veriable.1
Therefore i is uninsurable and may be considered as a background risk that
is comonotonic with D.
Under competition, insurers are constrained to earn zero expected prot.
We consider an insurance contract i; i where i denotes the premium and
i the indemnity net of the premium.
With public information (both on the probability and the loss Zi), the
optimal individual contract is given by solving
max
i;i
piU(W0   Zi + i) + (1  pi)U(W0   i)
which is subject to zero expected prot on each contract
(1  pi)i   pii = 0
Since the premium is actuarially fair, it is straightforward to show that
the optimal contracts provide full coverage thus implying i+i = Zi. From
the zero expected prot constraint, we obtain i = piZi.
3 Private information equilibrium
Under private information, insurers do not observe the individual risk charac-
teristics i.e. the probability pi and the uninsurable loss i. According to the
standard explanation of screening in insurance markets, rms use deductible
to sort high and low levels of risks. If this property is valid, then L-risk type
agents will accept a large deductible in order to signal their type and pay
a lower premium. This is due to the fact that only H-types want to mimic
L-types. L-types never choose an H-type contract which can be explained by
the single crossing property. This property states that, for any contract ; 
the marginal rate of substitution for the H-risk type must be lower than for
the L-risk type.
This property is true if the indi¤erence curve has a greater slope for the
L-type agents than for the H-type agents. Hence,
pL
1  pL
U 0(W0   )
U 0(W0  D + ) >
pH
1  pH
U 0(W0   )
U 0(W0  D  H + ) (1)
1As in Doherty and Jung(1993), we consider that applicants have di¤erent losses. Do-
herty and Jung show that, if losses are observed, adverse selection does not modify the
rst best contracts. Indeed, insurers may infer risk types from the loss. In our model, we
assume that policyholders have the same observable loss. Then, contrary to Doherty and
Jung, insurers cannot infer the type of policyholder by observing losses.
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As pL < pH and H > 0; this inequality always holds true.
As observed in a standard RS setting, this condition implies that the
H-risk type will overvalue a monetary transfer in the bad state compared
to the L-risk type agent. The H-risk type is thus willing to purchase more
insurance rather than the L-risk agent. Hence, competitive contracts under
full information are not incentive compatible. The H-risk agents prefer an L-
risk types contract because they receive the same indemnity but with a lower
premium. Insurers achieve separation by introducing a deductible. Thus the
L-risk type agent is o¤ered a contract with limited coverage at a low unit
price. Moreover the self selection constraint of L-type agents is never binding.
Therefore, we focus here on incentives for H-type agents .
Note that, contrary to RS under perfect information, di¤erent contracts
exhibit di¤erent indemnities. Thus it is not trivial that the self selection
constraint of H risk agents is binding.
We can characterize conditions such that rst best contracts are opti-
mal under asymmetric information i :e: such that the H-type self selection
constraint is slack.
The optimal contracts have to satisfy the following program :
max
H ;H ;L;L
 [p
H
U(W0  D  H + H) + (1  pH)U(W0   H)]
+ (1  ) [p
L
U(W0  D + L) + (1  pL)U(W0   L)]
subject to zero expected prot on each contract
(1  pL)L   pLL = 0
(1  pH)H   pHH = 0
and the H-type agents self selection constraint
pHU(W0  D  H + H) + (1  pH)U(W0   H) (2H)
 pHU(W0  D  H + L) + (1  pH)U(W0   L)
This program is the same as the previous one except that it contains a
self selection constraint. Clearly, ignoring this constraint will give rise to the
same solution. Then we can characterize situations such that this condition is
slack when rst best contracts are o¤ered. Therefore, we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 1 If the uninsurable loss is su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium
contracts under private information correspond to the rst best contracts.
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Proof. In order to characterize the equilibrium, rst best contracts have to
satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint :
u (w   pH (D +H))  pHu (w   pLD  H)  (1  pH)u (w   pLD)  0
Let us denote f(H ; pL) the left hand side of this constraint :
f(H ; pL) = u (w   pH (D +H)) pHu (w   pLD  H) (1 pH)u (w   pLD)
Note that f(0; pL = pH) = 0: If the risk type are the same, the incentive-
compatibility constraint is obviously satised.
Departing from (0; pL = pH) by decreasing pL we decrease f(H ; pL) and the
incentive-compatibility constraint is no longer satised since df(H ;pL)
dpl
> 0:
However such a decrease may be compensated by a variation of the uninsur-
able loss H such that the incentive-compatibility constraint remains satis-
ed. By fully di¤erentiating the function f(H ; pL), we know that
df(H ; pL) = pH [u
0 (w   pLD  H)  u0 (w   pH (D +H))] dH
+D [pHu
0 (w   pLD  H) + (1  pH)u0 (w   pLD)] dpL
Then df(H ; pL) = 0 if and only if
dH =  D [pHu
0 (w   pLD  H) + (1  pH)u0 (w   pLD)]
pH [u0 (w   pLD  H)  u0 (w   pH (D +H))] dpL
However, from H = 0, we can only consider an increase in the uninsurable
loss then it must be the case that dH > 0. Since dpL < 0, this will be true
if and only if
pH [u
0 (w   pLD  H)  u0 (w   pH (D +H))] < 0
which is equivalent to H >
(pH pL)
1 pH D = H (pL). Note that H (pH) = 0
then from (0; pL = pH), we know that
f(0 D [pHu
0 (w   pLD  H) + (1  pH)u0 (w   pLD)]
pH [u0 (w   pLD  H)  u0 (w   pH (D +H))] dpL; pL = pH dpL) = 0
Then, providing that H > H (pL), we can dene a function H (pL) such
that f(H ; pL) = 0 by using the implicit function theorem. Moreover, for
all H  H (pL) f(H ; pL)  0 meaning that the incentice-compatibility
constraint is always satised for the rst best contracts.
The intuition of this result is the following. A H-risk type agent who
chooses an L-risk type contract is no longer compensated for the uninsurable
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loss.2. A higher uninsurable loss decreases the wealth in the unfavourable
state but increases the di¤erence between insurance premiums. However
if the uninsurable loss is su¢ ciently large, the ensuing reduction in utility
due to it overwhelms the benet of a lower premium. Therefore the H-type
policyholders prefers their own type of contract.s in which their self selection
constraint is never binding. Optimal contracts under asymmetric information
are those of full information.
4 Conclusion
Crocker and Snow (2006) show that the existence of an unobservable inde-
pendent background risk may close some insurance markets. However, they
show that extending coverage to background risk can have a positive social
value. In this paper, we focus on a perfect correlation between risks. In
fact we consider that part of the loss is unobservable so it is therefore then
uninsurable as in the case of health or human capital. We establish certain
conditions whereby private information leads to the absence of ine¢ ciencies
in competitive markets. This comonotonic background risk induces policy-
holders to prefer their own rst best contract to any other contract they may
choose due to private information.
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